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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

This is the response brief of Plaintiff-Respondent Noah G. Hillen, in his capacity
as the personal representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith ("Hillen"). The facts of this
appeal are undisputed and established in the pleadings. For example, it is not disputed that
Defendant-Appellant David R. Gibson, d/b/a Black Diamond Compost Products ("Gibson")
occupies a portion of Estate-owned property referred to herein as the "Gibson Property". Nor is it
disputed that Gibson does not have Hillen's permission to possess the same. Consequently,
Hillen, on behalf of the Estate, previously demanded that Gibson remove himself and his
belongings from the Gibson Property. Gibson refused.
As a result, Hillen filed a complaint, seeking ej ectment and other relief. After
briefing and oral argument, Judge Hippler correctly concluded that Hillen proved the elements of
ejectment. The Court then issued a Judgment (and corresponding Writ of Assistance), ejecting
Gibson from the Gibson Property. Judge Hippler also certified the Judgment as final, pursuant to
I.R.C.P 54(b). Gibson, through his counsel, Vernon K. Smith, Jr. ("Vernon"), moved the District
Court to reconsider/amend the Judgment. The District Court denied the motion and Gibson
appealed.
Gibson-but mostly his attorney Vernon-claims the Estate, acting through its
personal representative, Hillen, lacks the authority to eject an unwanted party from Estate-owned
property. Cutting through Gibson/Vernon's irrelevant and incorrect facts and points, the
disposition of this appeal amounts to a single issue: does Hillen have the authority, as a personal
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representative, to eject an unwanted party from Estate property. Hillen does and he asks that this
Court AFFIRM.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
1.

The Estate Case.

While not strictly relevant to this matter-or necessary to decide it-Hillen offers
a brief background regarding how we got where we are currently. Victoria H. Smith ("Victoria"),
Vernon's mother, died in 2013. Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 463, 432 P.3d 6, 12
(2018). After Victoria's death, Judge Copsey, who is presiding over Victoria's estate case (the
"Estate Case"): (1) invalidated Victoria's will-drafted by Vernon-as the product of undue
influence; and (2) set aside a series of transactions by which Vernon transferred all of Victoria's
property to himself or entities controlled by him. Id. at 465-66, 432 P.3d at 14-15. After issuing
these rulings, Judge Copsey appointed Hillen as personal representative of the Estate, and
entered a judgment, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 70(b), which, for present
purposes, vested title to the Gibson Property in Hillen. (R. 131 1). That Judgment is referred to
here as the "Rule 70 Judgment".
Vernon appealed the invalidation of the will, the decision to set aside the property
transfers, and the Rule 70 Judgment. Matter of Estate of Smith, supra. As part of that appeal, this
Court considered "any matters occurring up to and including the post-trial judgment under
Rule 70(b)." Id. at 466, 432 P .3d at 15 (2018). After such consideration, this Court concluded
that "the decisions of the magistrate court are affirmed." Id. at 482, 432 P.3d at 31.
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2.

This Ejectment Action.

As a part of the administration of the Estate, Hillen sought to remove Gibson from
the Gibson Property. In so doing, Hillen initiated this action by filing a complaint and asserting
claims for ejectment (Count One), declaratory judgment / quiet title (Count Two), trespass
(Count Three), and unjust enrichment (Count Four). Each claim stems from the fact that Gibson
refuses to vacate the Gibson Property and has not paid any remuneration for his occupancy (R.
10-13). Gibson filed his Answer on July 5, 2019. (R. 28-52).
3.

Hillen's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

Hillen moved for: ( 1) partial judgment on the pleadings as to Count One for
ejectment; (2) entry of a Writ of Assistance to effectuate the Judgment; and (3) certification of
the Judgment, if entered, as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b) (Hillen's "Motion"). (R. 53-55). Hillen
filed the Motion and corresponding memorandum in support on August 5, 2019. (R. 53-65). In
addition, Hillen filed a Declaration in Support of Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings
and Motion to Certify Judgment Under I.R.C.P. 54(b) (Hillen's "Declaration") that same day. (R.
66-85). Hillen's Declaration was not filed because there was any dispute from the pleadings as to
any material fact, but only to support the need for a Writ of Assistance and/or final certification
if Hillen's Motion was granted. (R. 64, n.4).
Gibson opposed the Motion. In his September 12, 2019, response, Gibson raised
arguments largely coextensive with the claims raised in his Appellant's Opening Brief to this
Court. (R. 86-109); compare (R. 86-109) with Appellant's Opening Brief. Although not relevant,
1

For ease of reading, references to the Clerk's Record on Appeal in this Brief are

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 3

Gibson asserts, without support, that Gibson was a boon to the Gibson Property, rather than a
burden. (R. 89). Gibson also argues that: (1) this Court had not upheld the Rule 70 Judgment (R.
95-99); (2) Vernon was, and is, the owner of the Gibson Property via his status as an heir
(e.g. R. 13); and (3) Hillen, as the personal representative of the Estate, lacks the power to eject a

tenant from Estate property unless necessary to satisfy an Estate creditor (R. 99-103).

4.

Judge Rippler's Ruling and Judgment of Ejectment Against Gibson.

On October 2, 2019, having heard oral argument from the parties, Judge Hippler:
(1) granted Hillen's Motion; (2) issued a Memorandum Decision and Order; and (3) entered a
Judgment ejecting Gibson from the Gibson Property (the "Judgment"). (R. 117-127). Judge
Hippler also granted Hillen's request to certify the Judgment as final and issued a Writ of
Assistance. (R. 123-124). The next day, Judge Hippler entered an Amended Memorandum
Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings that was
identical to the original decision and order, but included an attachment that had been
inadvertently omitted from the original (the "Memorandum Decision"). (R. 129-146, 207).

5.

The Memorandum Decision Invalidated Most of Gibson's Claims on
Appeal.

Judge Rippler's Memorandum Decision concludes that the elements of ejectment
had been met: (1) Hillen, as the personal representative of the Estate, had sufficient ownership
interest to eject Gibson from Estate property; (2) Gibson was in possession of the Gibson
Property; and (3) Gibson was refusing to surrender possession of the Gibson Property. (R. 132).

designated by "R." followed by the page numbers cited with preceding zeros eliminated.
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Judge Hippler also directly addressed many of the claims presented by Gibson on
this appeal. For example, Judge Hippler pointed out that, while Estate property does generally
devolve to the heirs upon the decedent's death, that rule is subject to limitations, including the
personal representative's "right [and obligation] to . . . take possession or control of . . . the
decedent's property." (R. 133 (quoting LC. § 15-3-709)). Judge Hippler also noted that the
personal representative of an estate has the same power over estate property as that of an
absolute owner. (R. 133 (quoting LC. § 15-3-711)). Finally, Judge Hippler recognized that
Gibson's pleadings were a thinly veiled collateral attack on the Rule 70 Judgment and that
Gibson was "essentially request[ing] that the [District] Court act as an appellate court and
overrule the [Rule 70] Judgment in the other case, something it cannot do." (R. 135).

6.

Gibson Unsuccessfully Challenges the Judgment a Second Time.
a.

Gibson's Post-Judgment Motion.

Following entry of the Judgment and Memorandum Decision, Gibson moved to
alter or amend the Judgment on October 14, 2019. (R. 147-150). Gibson then filed a
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Court Decision and Motion to Amend
Judgment Under Rule 59(e), LR.C.P. on November 29, 2019. This was more than one month
after Gibson's original motion. (R. 188-206).
Gibson's primary contention was that it was not clear whether the Judgment and
Memorandum Decision established that Hillen had a valid claim of "absolute and sole ownership
of the estate property[,]" (e.g. R. 195) and that the practical effect of the Judgment and
Memorandum Decision was that Vernon and the other heir would be divested of their interests in
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the Estate. (e.g. R. 192, 196-197). Vernon was concerned that the Judgment for ejectment of a
party unrelated to the Estate case would somehow preclude Vernon, as an heir, from challenging
Hillen's actions as the personal representative or from pursuing a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty against Hillen. (R. 196-197).
b.

Judge Hippler Denies Gibson's Motion to Reconsider and/or to
Alter or Amend the Judgment.

Before the time came for Hillen to respond to Gibson's motion, Judge Hippler
denied the same, and sua sponte cancelled the hearing, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b )(3)(F). (R. 207).
In his Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend the
Judgment and Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees, Judge Hippler correctly recognized
the "procedural oddity" with the way Gibson brought his motion to Alter or Amend the
Judgment, noting that it appeared Gibson was trying to back door a motion to reconsider into his
brief. (R. 207, n. 2). Despite the oddity, Judge Hippler considered Gibson's motion under all
rules that could apply (R. 207, n. 2) and denied the same. To avoid confusion, Judge Rippler's
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment and
Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees will be referred to in this brief as the
"Reconsideration Denial".
Judge Hippler concluded that Gibson's motion presented a "false-bifurcation" and
noted that Hillen's statutory power over title to Estate property-the same an absolute owner
would have-created at least an ownership interest in the Gibson Property sufficient to eject
Gibson therefrom. (R. 208-209). This power, Judge Hippler continued, did not extinguish
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Vernon's interest in the Estate2 or prevent Vernon from bringing a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty against Hillen in the Estate Case. (R. 208-209). "Those issues were not presented to the
[District] Court, nor could they have been decided, as Vernon and the other heirs would have
been necessary parties and had not been joined." (R. 209). The same is true now, when Vernon,
under the guise of representing Gibson, reiterates those same claims.
Judge Hippler concluded by noting that, "[b ]eyond asking for clarification,
Gibson presents no real argument as to why the Court's order was incorrect." (R. 209). Instead,
Gibson was merely "once again collaterally attack[ing] the Judgment," and his motion to alter or
amend or reconsider was denied for the same reasons laid out in the Memorandum Decision.
(R. 209). Gibson's arguments "had no merit[.]" (R. 210).
Gibson filed his Notice of Appeal on December 31, 2019 (R. 212-252), and
submitted his Appellant's Opening Brief on June 1, 2020 ("Gibson's Opening Brief'). Gibson's
Opening Brief raises no arguments that were not directly and correctly considered and dismissed
by Judge Hippler below. Gibson's arguments still have no merit.
C.

Statement of Facts.
The facts necessary for this Court to uphold Judge Hippler' s Judgment and

Memorandum Decision are simple and undisputed. Prior to Victoria's death, she owned real
property, including the Gibson Property. (R. 130). Following Victoria's death, Judge Copsey, in
the Estate Case, appointed Hillen as the personal representative to the Estate and issued the Rule

2

Even if it had, Vernon was not a party to this case and Gibson did not have standing to
bring this claim.
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70 Judgment, which, in part, conveyed the Gibson Property to Hillen in his status as the personal
representative. (R. 131 ). Gibson currently occupies the Gibson Property. (R. 130). Despite
demand from Hillen to vacate, Gibson refuses to surrender possession of the Gibson Property.
(R. 131).
That's it. Those are the only facts relevant to Judge Rippler's Judgment and are
all that need be considered by this Court. Despite this, Gibson goes on for page after page,
asserting "facts" that are irrelevant or untrue or both. Hillen asks that this Court ignore the
Statement of Facts in Gibson's Opening Brief, which comprises little more than ad-hominem
gripes with Hillen. Gibson's Opening Brief at 8-13. The facts described in Gibson's Statement of
Facts are not supported by the record and the entire section is devoid of even a single record
citation. Gibson's Opening Brief at 8-13.
II.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The only true issue to be considered by this Court is whether Hillen, as the
personal representative of the Estate, has sufficient power over Estate property to eject Gibson
therefrom. Hillen does have that power as correctly concluded by Judge Hippler. Gibson's
arguments to the contrary reflect an incorrect understanding of Idaho's Uniform Probate Code.
Judge Hippler' s Memorandum Decision, Judgment, and Reconsideration Denial were correct and
Gibson has not shown otherwise.
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III.
A.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings.

The standard of review applicable to lower courts' rulings on motions for
judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for motions for summary judgment. Trimble v.
Engelking, 130 Idaho 300, 302, 939 P.2d 1379, 1381 (1997) ("Thus, the standard of review

applicable to lower courts' rulings on motions for summary judgment also applies to motions for
judgment on the pleadings."). "[W]here the record reveals no issues of disputed fact, the question
is one oflaw ... over which this Court exercises free review." Id.
B.

Motions to Reconsider.

"[W]hen reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for
reconsideration, this Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the lower court in
deciding the motion for reconsideration." Westover v. Idaho Ctys. Risk Mgmt. Program, 164
Idaho 385, 391, 430 P.3d 1284, 1290 (2018) (quoting Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,
276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012)).
C.

Motions to Alter or Amend Under Rule 59(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure.

A motion to alter or amend brought under Rule 59(e) rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court. And, while an order denying a motion made under Rule 59(e) is
appealable, the appeal is available "only on the question of whether there has been a manifest
abuse of discretion." Pandrea v. Barrett, 160 Idaho 165, 171, 369 P.3d 943, 949 (2016).
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IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

The District Court Correctly Determined that Hillen Proved The Three
Elements of Ejectment.
"An action for ' [e]jectment requires proof of (1) ownership, (2) possession by the

defendants, and (3) refusal of the defendants to surrender possession."' PHH Mortg. Servs. Corp.
v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 63 7, 200 P .3d 1180, 1186 (2009) (quoting Ada County Highway
District v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 369, 179 P.3d 323, 332 (2008)). The

second and third elements of ejectment are conceded by Gibson, so only the first element,
ownership, is at issue here. Memorandum Decision at 4 (R. 132); (R. 2, 11, 14, 18-20 (Gibson's
answer conceding that he possesses the Gibson Property and that he refuses to surrender
possession)). As correctly decided by Judge Hippler, Hillen owns the Gibson Property
sufficiently to prove the ownership element of ejectment for several different reasons, which are
addressed in tum below.
B.

Hillen, as the Personal Representative of the Estate, is the Owner of the
Gibson Property and/or Enjoys the Same Power as That of An Owner.
The Rule 70 Judgment unambiguously establishes that Hillen is the owner of the

Gibson Property. The Rule 70 Judgment is valid and effective, and has been upheld by this
Court. But-and this is significant-even if the Rule 70 Judgment was somehow ineffective, this
is immaterial since Hillen has the power over the Gibson Property as that of an absolute owner,
which necessarily includes the ability to eject an unwanted person from the property. Each
argument is discussed in tum.
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As found by Judge Hippler, "[t]he [Rule 70] Judgment clearly gives Hillen
ownership of the [[Gibson]] Property, as it vest[s] in [Hillen] ... any and all real property of any
kind of [sic] nature, including [the [[Gibson]] Property]." Memorandum Decision at 4 (R. 132)
(quoting Rule 70 Judgment). The Rule 70 Judgment is unambiguous. It vests all right, title, and
interest in the Gibson Property to Hillen. The Rule 70 Judgment is a valid judgment, lawfully
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. It has not been overturned or otherwise successfully
challenged. It is the law.
Beyond that-and what makes Gibson's repetitive arguments frivolous-is the
fact that this Court directly considered and upheld the Rule 70 Judgment. Matter of Estate of
Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 463, 432 P.3d 6, 12 (2018). The opening paragraph of this Court's recent

decision in Smith states that Vernon appealed from decisions of the magistrate court "and a
corresponding judgment entered pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 70(b) [the Rule 70
Judgment]. We affirm the decisions of the magistrate court." 164 Idaho at 463, 432 P.3d at 12.
Given the ruling in Smith, Hillen undisputedly owns the Gibson Property and can assert all
powers associated with such ownership. 3

3

Gibson falsely claims "[t]he only issues presented to the Supreme Court for
determination on that portion of the bifurcated appeal was invalidation of the holographic will
and 'power of attorney transfers' of Decedent's property by the July 12, 2012 transfer, which
transfer was nullified by the magistrate." Gibson's Opening Brief at 25 (it is unknown what
Gibson was quoting in this passage as he failed to attribute the quote to any citation). He claims
the Rule 70 Judgment was never put at issue. Id.
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Even if the Rule 70 Judgment did not exist, Hillen would still have sufficient
power over the Gibson Property to eject Gibson therefrom. Whatever other conclusions have
been reached in the Estate Case, Gibson and Vernon agree that ownership of the Gibson Property
reverted to the Estate when Judge Copsey invalidated Vernon's transfer of the same to himself.
Gibson's Opening Brief at 25 (acknowledging that "Decedent's property ... was to be returned
to the prior ownership").
Idaho's Uniform Probate Code provides personal representatives, like Hillen, with
"the same power over the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner would have, in
trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and others interested in the estate." LC. § 15-3-711
(emphasis added). An absolute owner would unquestionably have the power to eject an
unwanted party from the owner's property. Therefore, by the plain and unambiguous language of
Idaho Code Section 15-3-711, Hillen has the power to eject Gibson from Estate property.
Along those same lines, Idaho Code Section 15-3-709 expressly provides that
personal representatives, like Hillen, "may maintain an action to recover possession of [estate]
property or to determine the title thereto." LC. § 15-3-709. This ejectment action is an action to

If Gibson's counsel were uninvolved with the Smith case, the misstatement may be
attributable to a simple mistake, but of course Vernon himself brought the appeal resulting in the
Smith decision, in which Vernon expressly invited this Court to address the issue he now claims
was not presented. "Vernon respectfully requests this Court reverse the court's Order Granting
Partial Summary Judgment upon the 2012 Transfers, together with the June 2, 2017 Judgment
on Motion Under Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." Appellant's Opening Brief
(filed February 12, 2018), Matter of Estate of Smith, 2018 WL 2103594 (Idaho) at 2-3 (emphasis
added). Additional instances of Vernon's express requests for this Court to consider and reverse
the Rule 70 Judgment can be found at pages 20 and 44 of his Appellant's Opening Brief, as well
as page 35 of his Reply Brief (2018 WL 2462977).
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recover possession of Estate property, and Hillen is statutorily enabled to maintain this action. To
find otherwise would require this Court to invalidate multiple sections of the Idaho Code. It
should not do so. Upholding Judge Hippler' s decisions is the only legally sound conclusion.
Because the three elements of ejectment are met here for multiple distinct reasons, the Judgment,
Memorandum Decision, and Reconsideration Denial are proper and must be upheld.

C.

Gibson Presents No Reason for Reversing the Judgment, Memorandum
Decision or Reconsideration Denial.
The Court need look no further than the above analysis to uphold Judge Rippler's

various decisions below: (1) the elements of ejectment having been met; and (2) the Judgment,
Memorandum Decision, and Reconsideration Denial were properly entered (and the latter
certainly does not emanate from any abuse of discretion). However, if the Court considers the
voluminous and irrelevant argument presented by Gibson, nothing therein presents a valid reason
to revisit any of Judge Hippler' s decisions.

1.

Hillen Has Never Asserted He Personally Owns Estate Property.

Gibson's incorrect analysis can all be traced to one misunderstanding maintained
by Vernon: he incorrectly believes Hillen is asserting that Hillen owns the Estate property
personally, rather than in his capacity as personal representative of the Estate. Once this incorrect
premise is assumed, it is a little easier to understand Vernon's concern that he will be divested of
his interest in Estate property, and little easier to understand why Vernon thinks the Judgment
contains an inherent inconsistency. Judge Hippler came to the same realization about Vernon's
misunderstanding. Reconsideration Denial at 3 (R. 209).
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Of course, Hillen is not now asserting, and has never asserted, that he owns the
Gibson Property-or any Estate property-in his personal capacity. He brought this action in his
capacity as the personal representative for the Estate so he could administer the Estate to the
benefit of all the heirs, including Vernon. That clarification nullifies all of Vernon's concerns.
Vernon's interest as an heir of the Estate does not affect Hillen's ejectment claim, and Vernon's
interest as an heir is unaffected by the outcome of this case.
2.

Vernon's Interest as an Heir of the Estate Does Not Defeat Hillen's
Ejectment Claim.

Gibson (through Vernon) claims Vernon's partial interest in the Gibson Property
became "vested" pursuant to Idaho Code Section 15-3-101 upon Victoria's death, and that that
somehow supersedes the Rule 70 Judgment. Gibson's Opening Brief at 23, 28, 43. Not so. First,
Section 15-3-101 does not mention permanently vesting interests nor pre-emption of future
orders or judgments. Instead, that section opens by expressly noting that the rights of heirs like
Vernon "are subject to the restrictions and limitations contained in this code to facilitate the
prompt settlement of estates." LC. § 15-3-101. To further emphasize this point, the section
concludes by noting that estate property "is subject ... to administration." Id.
So, contrary to Vernon's assertions, title to Estate property is not automatically
vested with him, but is instead subject to the restrictions and limitations contained in the Uniform
Probate Code and is otherwise subject to administration. The restrictions and limitations
contemplated by the Uniform Probate Code include the personal representative's "power over
the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner would have," (LC.§ 15-3-711) as well as
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the personal representative's "right to ... possession or control of, the decedent's property" and
statutory authority to "maintain an action to recover possession of property or to determine the
title thereto." I.C. § 15-3-709.
The comments to Section 15-3-711 make it clear that the power conferred on
Hillen is "the broadest possible 'power over title'" and state that the power is "conceived to
embrace all possible transactions which might result in a conveyance or encumbrance of assets,
or in a change o(possession." (emphasis added). Those powers, statutorily granted to Hillen as
the personal representative, are precisely what empowers Hillen to bring and maintain this
ejectment action, and are precisely why Judge Hippler was correct to issue the Judgment,
Memorandum Decision, and Reconsideration Denial.
Judge Hippler considered and rejected the applicability of the case law Vernon
cites. Hillen's analysis on the subject would add nothing, so he rests on Judge Rippler's
considered reasoning:
The cases cited by Gibson do not compel a different result. They
stand for the general rule that a decedent's property immediately
descends to an heir upon the decedent's death, but neither one
addressed the language in I.C. § 15-3-101 that an heir's right to a
decedent's property "are subject to restrictions and limitations."
See generally, El/maker [v. Tabor], 160 Idaho 576, 377 P.3d 390
[(2015)]; Fairchild [v. Fairchild], 106 Idaho 147, 676 P.2d 722
[(1984)]. In those cases, there was no need to consider a personal
representative's temporary power over the property, and its effect
on an heir's right to immediate vesting of title. In El !maker "there
was no probate of [the decedent's] estate." 160 Idaho at 580, 377
P.3d at 394, so there would not have been a personal
representative. And although in Fairchild the estate had been
probated, the issue in that case was whether one heir had adversely
possessed the property or instead was a cotenant with the other
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heirs by common inheritance. 106 Idaho at 150,676 P.2d at 725. It
had nothing to do with the personal representative's temporary
power to control the property. See id. Because neither El/maker or
Fairchild addressed any sort of "restriction" mentioned in LC. §
15-3-101, their holdings are no more than reiterations of the
general rule. They do not help in deciding the scope of a personal
representative's temporary statutory power over a decedent's
property.
Memorandum Decision at 5-6 (R. 133-134).
Gibson adds no new analysis to his case citations on appeal. The same reasoning
employed by Judge Hippler still defeats his position.

3.

Vernon's Interest in the Estate is Unaffected by and Irrelevant to This
Case.

Vernon asserts multiple times that Hillen is in breach of his fiduciary duties to the
Estate's heirs. See, e.g., Gibson's Opening Brief at 30, 40, 42. Hillen is not, but that is irrelevant
and Gibson has no standing to bring such an action. It is undisputed that Gibson is not an heir to
the Estate, and is owed no fiduciary duty by Hillen.
If Vernon feels that Hillen is in breach of his fiduciary duties, he is free to raise

those concerns in the appropriate forum, which is not this case. This case is (or should have
been) a simple action for ejectment comprising only three elements. That Hillen is not
administering the Estate properly is not a defense to any of the elements of ejectment, and
Vernon is not precluded from raising those issues in the court-administered Estate Case.
Therefore, as concluded by Judge Hippler, Hillen's fiduciary duties to the heirs
are perfectly compatible with his power to eject Gibson from Estate property. Memorandum
Decision at 6 (R. 134). In other words, as the comment notes, an heir may be able to sue "for
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breach of fiduciary duty, but this possibility should not interfere with the personal
representative's administrative authority as it relates to possession of the estate."' Memorandum
Decision at 6 (R. 134) (quoting comment to Idaho Code 15-3-709).
No possible outcome of this case could divest Vernon of his interest as an heir.
And, the Judgment that issued in this case did not affect that status. Rather, it merely required
Gibson-who has no interest in the Estate-to vacate the Gibson Property. Vernon's interests as
an heir are unaffected, and Hillen cannot use the Judgment as a sword to claim personal
ownership of the Gibson Property because the Judgment says nothing of the sort.
V.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS4

Hillen is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs against Gibson on this
appeal. Hillen makes this request pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and Idaho Code § 12-121 (permitting an
award of fees "when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation."). At the risk of providing too fine a point on the matter,
Gibson and his counsel have not presented any legitimate points of law or fact as to why this
Court should reverse any of the trial court's decisions. Gibson simply repeats the same
arguments to this Court that failed below. This Court should, therefore, assess fees (and costs)
against Gibson and in favor of Hillen.

4

Gibson does not claim an entitlement to attorney fees in this appeal and should not
receive them. Gibson appears to insinuate that, if he prevails, the District Court should award
him his appellate attorney fees after a trial. See Gibson's Opening Brief at 49. But there is no
basis for such an award and Gibson's failure to cite authority for appellate fees is fatal to any
such fees being awarded. A & J Const. Co. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 688, 116 P.3d 12, 18 (2005).
Under no circumstances should Gibson be awarded his appellate fees in this case.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Hillen respectfully requests that this Court:
(1) uphold Judge Rippler's Judgment, Memorandum Decision, and Reconsideration Denial; and
(2) award Hillen his attorneys' fees and costs on appeal and in the proceedings below.
Respectfully submitted on June 29, 2020.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By
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